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ABSTRACT
In this paper we examine the role of social security in an economy populated by overlapping generations
of individuals with time-inconsistent preferences who face mortality risk, individual income risk, and bor-
rowing constraints. Agents in this economy are heterogeneous with respect to age, employment status, re-
tirement status, hours worked, and asset holdings. We consider two cases of time-inconsistent prefer-
ences. First, we model agents as quasi-hyperbolic discounters. They can be sophisticated and play a sym-
metric Nash game against their future selves; or they can be naive and believe that their future selves will
exponentially discount. Second, we consider retrospective time inconsistency. We find that (1) there are
substantial welfare costs to quasi-hyperbolic discounters of their time-inconsistent behavior, (2) social se-
curity is a poor substitute for a perfect commitment technology in maintaining old-age consumption, (3)
there is little scope for social security in a world of quasi-hyperbolic discounters (with a short-term dis-
count rate up to 15%), and, (4) the ex ante annual discount rate must be at least 10% greater than seems
warranted ex post in order for a majority of individuals with retrospective time inconsistency to prefer a
social security tax rate of 10% to no social security. Our findings question the effectiveness of unfunded
social security in correcting for the undersaving resulting from time-inconsistent preferences.
*An earlier version of this paper, dated June 14, 1999, circulated with the title “Myopia and Social Security.” We
thank participants of seminars at UCLA, 1999 Annual Meetings of the Society for Economic Dynamics, NYU, Yale
University, Carnegie Mellon University, University of Pittsburgh, University of California at Riverside, Texas
Monetary Conference, and the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. The views expressed herein are those of the
authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the United States and most other developed countries, the public pension
system and associated beneﬁt payments to retirees and their families (including
disability, medical, and survivor beneﬁts) constitute the largest item in the
government budget. Partly because of their scale, these programs have during
the last quarter century become the object of intense study by economists, who
have become increasingly aware of the large eﬀects such programs may have on
many aspects of the economy.
The literature on unfunded public pensions has identiﬁed a variety of both
costs and beneﬁts of such systems. The major beneﬁts arise from the fact
that social security may provide avenues for risk sharing that are not otherwise
available in private markets. The costs consist largely of distortions to the labor
supply and saving decisions.
An important economic consequence of unfunded social security concerns its
eﬀects on the capital stock. In a model populated by overlapping generations
of pure life-cycle consumers who supply labor inelastically, unfunded social se-
curity lowers the steady-state capital stock (Diamond, 1965). This eﬀect arises
because social security redistributes income away from younger agents with
lower marginal propensities to consume and toward older agents with higher
marginal propensities to consume.1 Social security may also distort the labor
supply decision. In an unfunded system, the mandatory contributions of cur-
rent workers are immediately paid out as beneﬁts to current retirees. These
contributions in turn entitle current workers to future retirement beneﬁts. To
the extent that an additional dollar of current contributions results in less than
a one-dollar increase in the present value of future beneﬁts, these contributions
constitute a tax on labor income.
On the other hand, social security may increase welfare by improving the
allocation of risk bearing in the economy. It is possible that certain vehicles for
allocating risk are unavailable or are very costly in private markets. Depending
upon the reasons for the lack of private insurance, social security might provide a
lower-cost substitute for private contracts. Annuity markets provide an example.
One would expect life-cycle consumers facing uncertain death dates to utilize
individual annuity contracts to smooth consumption and insure against the risk
of outliving their assets. Although private annuity markets exist in the United
States, the volume of contracts in these markets is surprisingly small, possibly
because of adverse selection (Friedman and Warshawsky, 1990).2 By imposing a
mandatory annuity system, social security might substitute for missing private
annuity markets and might at least mitigate the welfare losses due to adverse
selection.3
1The eﬀect of social security in depressing the capital stock may be mitigated or eliminated
if agents have an operative bequest motive (Barro, 1974).
2Individuals might choose not to annuitize all their wealth if they have operative bequest
motives or wish to self-insure against large medical or nursing home expenses.
3Diamond (1977) discusses various rationales for a social security system qualitatively like
that in the United States. Hubbard and Judd (1987), ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, and Joines
(1995,1999), and Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (1999) evaluate the quantitative trade-oﬀ
2Unfunded social security might also improve the intergenerational allocation
of risk. If there is substantial generation-speciﬁc income risk due to phenomena
such as the Great Depression, ﬁscal policy tools like public debt or unfunded
social security might be used to spread this risk across many generations. It
would be impossible for private contracts to insure against these income shocks
to the extent that some of the generations who are potential parties to the
contracts are born only after the shock is realized.4
In addition to the beneﬁts discussed above, some have argued that social
security may provide welfare gains for agents who lack the foresight to save
adequately for their retirement. For example, Diamond (1977, p. 281) states
that a “justiﬁcation for Social Security is that many individuals will not save
enough for retirement if left to their own devices.” Kotlikoﬀ, Spivak, and
Summers (1982) remark on the widely held belief that the “essential premise
underlying the Social Security system ... is that left to their own devices, large
numbers of people would fail to save adequately and ﬁnd themselves destitute
in their old age.” And according to Feldstein (1985, p. 303), the “principal
rationale for such mandatory programs is that some individuals lack the foresight
to save for their retirement years.”
Extensive empirical evidence is cited to support the view that many house-
holds do not save adequately, although much of this evidence is subject to al-
ternative interpretations. Studies using a wide variety of data have documented
that a substantial fraction of the U.S. population accumulates very little wealth
relative to its lifetime income. For example, Avery, Elliehausen, Canner, and
Gustafson (1984) examined data from the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances
and found that fewer than half of all households held more as much as $5000
in ﬁnancial assets. Median ﬁnancial assets of those at or near retirement age
(55-64) were less than $10,000. Almost 3/4 of households in this age group had
positive equity in housing, however, with a median value of $55,000 for those
with positive equity. Akerlof (1991), citing evidence reported by Hurd (1990),
states that the “stark absence of ﬁnancial asset income [among the elderly] is
consistent with the hypothesis that most households would save very little, ex-
cept for the purchase of their home and the associated amortization of mortgage
principal, in the absence of private pension plans.” Other studies documenting
low levels of wealth accumulation include Diamond (1977), Feldstein and Feen-
berg (1983), Diamond and Hausman (1984), Avery and Kennickell (1991), and
Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995).
The mere fact that many individuals fail to accumulate large stocks of wealth
does not imply that they lack foresight, however. As Bernheim, Skinner, and
between the insurance beneﬁts of social security against the saving distortion and ﬁnd that
the cost of social security outweighs its beneﬁts. Also see ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu (1999).
4See Gordon and Varian (1988), Gale (1990), Diamond (1996, 1997), and Bohn (1997).
Recent justiﬁcations for the emergence and maintenance of the unfunded pension system are
provided by Cooley and Soares (1999) and Boldrin and Rustichini (1999), who analyze social
security as the outcome of majority voting. Transitional costs toward privatization also seem
important. Huang, ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, and Sargent (1997), De Nardi, ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, and Sargent
(1999), and Kotlikoﬀ, Smetters, and Walliser (1999) document the intergenerational welfare
distribution of various alternative reform schemes.
3Weinberg (1997, p. 1) note, “if one takes the view that saving reﬂects rational,
farsighted optimization, then low savers are simply expressing their preferences
for current consumption over future consumption”. They contrast this view
with one in which “households are shortsighted, irrational, prone to regret, or
heavily inﬂuenced by psychological motives”. Distinguishing between these two
points of view requires more detailed analysis of the data. Bernheim (1995)
compares the observed saving of a group of baby boom households with that
which would be required to maintain consumption after retirement at the same
level as before retirement. He reports that these households’ saving (in excess
of Social Security and other pension assets) is only one third as much as would
be required to maintain their pre-retirement levels of consumption if one as-
sumes no reductions in future Social Security beneﬁts. The shortfall in saving is
even greater if one assumes reductions in Social Security. Because rational, far-
sighted households may have preferences that call for lower consumption after
retirement than before, a ﬁnding that their resources are insuﬃcient to main-
tain pre-retirement levels of consumption need not imply any shortsightedness
on their part. Even if one accepts the pre-retirement level of consumption as a
benchmark, Bernheim’s ﬁndings appear to contradict those of Kotlikoﬀ, Spivak,
and Summers (1982). They perform similar calculations for a sample drawn
from the Retirement History Survey in the early 1970s and ﬁnd that at least
3/4 of households at retirement could ﬁnance a constant consumption stream
over the remainder of their lives larger than the one they could have ﬁnanced
at age 30, and only a small fraction would be forced to accept a substantially
smaller level of consumption. They also report (p. 1068) that if “Social Security
were removed, and not replaced by private accumulation, a large fraction of the
aged population would face very sharp declines in living standards.”5
Several papers that examine the behavior of the elderly report a drop in
consumption at retirement that is sometimes taken as evidence of a lack of fore-
sight. For example, Hammermesh (1984) ﬁnds that consumption in the ﬁrst
year or two after retirement is larger than can be sustained by available re-
sources, which include Social Security, private pensions, and the annuity value
of physical and ﬁnancial wealth. Consumption then drops by about 9% over the
next two years. Mariger (1987) estimates that, after adjusting for changes in
household size, consumption at retirement drops 47% below the upward trend
implied by pre-retirement behavior. While such a drop in consumption might
5The results of Kotlikoﬀ, Spivak, and Summers (1982) do not contradict ﬁndings of low
asset holdings by the elderly, because Social Security, private pensions, and earnings from
part-time work account for the bulk of retirement resources in their sample. To the extent
that this is also true of Bernheim’s sample, his calculation that baby boomers are saving
enough to replace only one third of their requirements unaccounted for by these three items
need not imply a large decline in consumption during retirement and may in fact be broadly
consistent with the Kotlikoﬀ-Spivak-Summers results. Furthermore, if desired consumption in
retirement is somewhat lower than that during working years, there may be no saving shortfall.
See Gale (1997), who provides numerical examples and raises more general questions about
such estimates of the adequacy of retirement saving.
Diamond (1977) also contains calculations of asset levels required to achieve various con-
sumption targets and compares these with observed asset holdings.
4be due to inadequate planning for a predictable decline in income, it might also
result from unforeseen events like physical incapacity that cause individuals to
retire earlier than they had planned, thus leading to an unanticipated reduc-
tion in lifetime resources. Hausman and Paquette (1987) report that workers
who retire involuntarily experience a particularly sharp drop in consumption,
although voluntary retirees also experience some decline. In addition, a sudden
decline in consumption at retirement might be due to a substitution of leisure
for market goods.
Banks, Blundell, and Tanner (1998), document a sharp drop in the average
consumption of a cross section of households around the typical retirement age.
They ﬁnd that some, but not all, of this reduction can be attributed to changing
consumption patterns associated with withdrawal from the labor force, such as
reductions in work-related expenses and possibly a more general substitution of
leisure for market goods. After considering several explanations, they conclude
that the remainder of the consumption decline must be due to the arrival of new
information, with the most likely candidate being negative innovations to the
income process because workers have underestimated their retirement income.
Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg (1997) also document a discrete drop in
consumption at retirement, with the size of the decline being negatively related
to wealth and the income replacement rate. They examine expenditure by type
of good and conclude that the drop in reported consumption cannot be fully
accounted for by a reduction in work-related expenses, although their evidence
against more general goods-leisure substitution seems tenuous. They also ﬁnd
that their results are largely unaﬀected after controlling for unplanned retire-
ment. They conclude that “a broad range of factors operating within models of
rational, farsighted, optimizing agents are collectively incapable of accounting
for joint patterns of wealth and consumption” (p.3), that “the empirical pat-
terns in this paper are more easily explained if one steps outside the framework
of rational, farsighted optimization” (p. 48), and that “on average individuals
who arrive at retirement with few resources experience a ‘surprise’ — they take
stock of their ﬁnances only to discover that their resources are insuﬃcient to
maintain their accustomed standards of living” (p. 4).
Despite the apparently widespread view that many individuals may lack the
foresight to save adequately for their retirement, there have been few attempts
to analyze the eﬀectiveness of social security in mitigating the welfare costs of
such undersaving. Feldstein (1985) examines a two-period overlapping genera-
tions economy with inelastic labor supply and no uncertainty and analyzes the
welfare consequences of social security in an environment with myopic agents.
He models myopia by assuming that elderly agents attach greater weight to
period-2 outcomes than do young agents. In that framework, reductions in sav-
ing constitute the only welfare cost of social security, and providing consumption
for myopic agents constitutes the only beneﬁt. His ﬁndings indicate that even
if every individual is substantially myopic it may be optimal to have either no
social security system or one in which the social security replacement ratio is
very low.
An alternative way of modeling myopia stems from the literature on time-
5inconsistent behavior and more speciﬁcally from the recent literature dealing
with quasi-hyperbolic discounting.6 Strotz (1956) argues that mechanisms that
constrain the future choices of agents may be desirable if their behavior exhibits
time inconsistency. Social security may be viewed as such a commitment de-
vice. According to Akerlof (1998, p. 187), the “hyperbolic model explains the
uniform popularity of social security, which acts as a pre-commitment device
to redistribute consumption from times when people would be tempted to over-
spend — during their working lives — to times when they would otherwise be
spending too little — in retirement . [S]uch a transfer is most likely to improve
welfare signiﬁcantly.”
In this paper we examine the welfare eﬀects of unfunded social security on
individuals who exhibit two distinct forms of time-inconsistent preferences. In
addition to incorporating quasi-hyperbolic discounting, our model nests the ret-
rospective form of time inconsistency analyzed by Feldstein (1985) and extends
his framework to include a wider range of beneﬁts and costs of social security. In
order to examine the role of social security in an economy with time-inconsistent
preferences, we construct a model which consists of overlapping generations of
65-period-lived individuals facing mortality risk, individual income risk, and
borrowing constraints. At any point in time there is a continuum of agents with
total measure one. Private annuity markets and credit markets are closed by as-
sumption. Agents in this economy choose the number of hours worked whenever
they are given the opportunity to do so. If they are not given the opportu-
nity to work, they receive unemployment insurance. Agents in this economy
accumulate assets to provide for old-age consumption and, because they face
liquidity constraints, to self-insure against future income shocks. Elderly agents
receive social security beneﬁts that are ﬁnanced by a payroll tax on workers.
At any time after reaching the normal retirement age, they may make an irre-
versible decision to draw social security beneﬁts, although collection of beneﬁts
does not preclude working. Individuals in this economy are heterogenous with
respect to their age, employment status, retirement status, hours worked, and
asset holdings.
We consider two cases of quasi-hyperbolic discounting. In some experiments,
we assume that the agents are naive in the sense that they ignore the fact that
their future selves will also implement quasi-hyperbolic discounting. In most
cases, however, we allow for more sophisticated behavior by assuming the agents
take into account their future selves’ quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
In this environment social security may provide additional utility for myopic
agents who regret their saving decisions when they ﬁnd themselves with low
consumption after retirement. In addition, social security may substitute for
missing private annuity markets in helping agents allocate consumption in the
face of uncertain life spans. On the other hand, social security distorts aggregate
saving and labor supply behavior and aﬀects the wage rate and the interest
rate. Consequently, whether or not social security is welfare enhancing even for
6For example, see Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Laibson (1994, 1995, 1997). For time-
inconsistent preferences more generally, see Strotz (1956), Pollak (1968), Kydland and Prescott
(1977), Thaler and Shefrin (1981), and Goldman (1979, 1980), among others.
6myopic agents is a quantitative question. We evaluate lifetime welfare from
diﬀerent vantage points in the life cycle.
We specify the optimization problem of the individual as a ﬁnite-state, ﬁnite-
horizon, dynamic program and use numerical methods to compute stationary
equilibria under alternative social security arrangements. Our calibration pro-
cedure follows Cooley and Prescott (1995) and restricts the parameters of the
model using measurements from the U.S. economy.
Our ﬁndings can be summarized as follows:
• With time-consistent preferences, the actuarial reward for survival that
social security provides is not quantitatively large enough to render a
world with social security desirable; there is a signiﬁcant welfare cost to
social security, viewed at any age, although the cost declines with age.
These ﬁndings are in accord with previous research.
• Quasi-hyperbolic discounting at the rate of 15% lowers the capital stock
by about 20% at any social security tax rate, and there are substantial
steady-state welfare costs to quasi-hyperbolic discounters of their time-
inconsistent behavior.
• Social security is a poor substitute for a perfect commitment technology
in maintaining old-age consumption; the capital stock would be about
one-third larger in the absence of social security than with a tax rate of
10%.
• In a world of quasi-hyperbolic discounters, sophisticated or naive, un-
funded social security generally does not raise welfare for short-term dis-
count rates of at least 15%.
• Social security does raise the welfare of naive quasi-hyperbolic discounters
with a short-term discount rate of 40%.
• With retrospective time inconsistency of the form considered by Feldstein
(1985), the ex ante annual discount rate must be at least 10% greater than
seems warranted ex post in order for a majority of the population to prefer
a social security tax rate of 10% to no social security.
Overall, our quantitative ﬁndings question the eﬃcacy of unfunded social
security in correcting for the undersaving resulting from quasi-hyperbolic pref-
erences.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model economy
and characterizes its stationary equilibrium. Section 3 discusses calibration of
the model’s parameters and summarizes the solution method. Section 4 uses
the model to perform a quantitative analysis of the eﬀects of an unfunded social
security program on the welfare of myopic and non-myopic agents. Section 5
concludes.
72A M o d e l o f S o c i a l S e c u r i t y
2.1 The Environment
Time is discrete. The setup is a stationary overlapping generations economy.
At each date, a new generation is born which is n% larger than the previous
generation. Individuals face long but random lives and some live through age
J, the maximum possible life span. Life-span uncertainty is described by ψj,
the conditional survival probability from age j − 1 to j.7 Under our stationary
population assumption, the cohort shares, {µj}J
j=1, are given by
µj = ψjµj−1/(1 + n), where
J X
j=1
µj =1 . (1)
2.2 Preferences and Measures of Utility
Preferences are deﬁned over sequences of consumption and labor {cj,` j}J
j=1.
The essence of myopia is that the value agents attach to these sequences de-
pends on the agent’s vantage point. In particular, the agent may value actions
diﬀerently ex post than at the time those actions are taken, and so may later
regret those actions. Social security can have potentially large eﬀects on the
average lifetime levels of consumption and labor and also on the allocation of
consumption and labor over the life cycle. Reductions in consumption and
leisure across the entire life cycle would presumably be disfavored by agents of
all ages. The possibility that social security can improve the welfare of myopic
agents, however, is primarily a question of whether the resulting intertemporal
redistributions of consumption and labor would raise utility as viewed from at
least some ages.8
If preferences are time-consistent, and assuming ψj =1 .0 ∀j (i.e. ignor-
ing life-span uncertainty), the value an agent of age j∗ places on the lifetime
consumption and labor sequences {c1,` 1,c 2,` 2,...,c j∗,` j∗,...,c J,` J} is inde-
pendent of the agent’s vantage point j∗. If preferences are time-inconsistent,
this valuation depends on j∗. We are concerned with a particular type of time
inconsistency in preferences that can be characterized as follows. Let Uj de-
note the marginal utility of consumption at age j and suppose that the values
of consumption and leisure in all periods of life are ﬁxed. Also suppose that
an agent’s preferences are such that the ratio of marginal utilities Uj0/Uj∗ for
some j∗ and j0 >j ∗ is larger when viewed from age j0 than from age j∗.I fa t
age j∗ the agent acts so as to equate this ratio of marginal utilities (as viewed
at that time) to the marginal rate of transformation, then upon reaching age j0
7We assume that the survival probabilities ψj and the population growth rate n are time-
invariant. For studies that examine the impact of time-variation in either demographic vari-
able, see De Nardi, ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu and Sargent (1999).
8It is possible that social security results in intertemporal redistributions that are desirable,
at least as viewed by individuals of some ages, but also reduces total lifetime consumption
and leisure by more than enough to eliminate the welfare gains from these reallocations.
8he will regret having consumed so much and saved so little at age j∗.W er e f e r
to preferences that result in this sort of regret as myopic, and we consider two
features of preferences that can lead to myopia thus deﬁned.9
Speciﬁcally, suppose that an individual of age j∗ has preferences over lifetime














Here, βf is the agent’s forward-looking discount factor and βb is the backward-
looking discount factor. The expectations operator in the ﬁnal term accounts
for mortality risk, whereas βf incorporates discounting only for pure time pref-
erence. Note that utility depends on consumption and leisure in the past as
well as in current and future periods. The case where βf < βb corresponds
to the form of mypoia considered by Feldstein (1985).10 The parameter δ ≤ 1
allows for the possibility that, viewed from today, the discount rate between this
period and next may be greater than that between any two consecutive periods
further into the future. The case where δ < 1 corresponds to the form of time
inconsistency considered by Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Laibson (1997). This
case leads not only to time-inconsistent preferences but also to time-inconsistent
behavior in the sense that the optimal policy functions derived at age j∗ for ages
j0 >j ∗ will no longer be optimal when the agent arrives age j0. In the absence
of any commitment technology, the agent’s future behavior will deviate from
that prescribed by the earlier policy functions. Strotz (1956) showed that time-
consistent behavior requires that the discount factor connecting any two periods
(current or future) vary exponentially as a function of the length of the interval
between the two periods. For βf < 1,av a l u eo fδ less than unity results in dis-
count factors that decline approximately hyperbolically from period j∗ into the
9It should be noted that we are not concerned with cross-sectional reallocations among
agents of diﬀerent ages at a point in time, with the past consumption and labor of all cohorts
ﬁxed. In particular, we are not considering instituting social security or changing an existing
system, with welfare judged only by the eﬀects on current and prospective consumption of
currently alive and future agents. It seems quite reasonable to believe that individuals of
diﬀerent ages would disagree about the desirability of such policy changes. Instead, our
experiments can be viewed as comparing the steady states of economies with diﬀerent policy
arrangements and asking which of these economies agents would prefer. We are concerned
with whether agents of diﬀerent ages would choose to live in diﬀerent economies if moving from
one economy to another required the admittedly unrealistic possibility of ex post changes in
prior consumption and labor so as to conform to those in the newly chosen economy. Viewed
in this way, agents with time-consistent preferences would never switch economies whereas
agents with time-inconsistent preferences might do so.
10Caplin and Leahy (1999) also consider a preference structure similar to (2). They give
particular attention to the case where βf < 1 < βb, implying that individuals downweight both
the past and the future relative to the present. Their paper contains an extensive justiﬁcation
of the assumption that βb is ﬁnite (i.e.., individuals remember and their memories matter)
but less than unity (memory may be fallible).
9future.11 Phelps and Pollack (1968) analyzed the time inconsistency in behav-
ior resulting from a quasi-hyperbolic discounting parameter δ less than unity.
The form of myopia considered by Feldstein does not lead to this sort of time
inconsistency in behavior.
The preference structure in equation (2) determines individual behavior and
also constitutes the basis for making welfare comparisons among alternative
social security arrangements. The ﬁrst summation on the right-hand-side of the
equation is irrelevant for determining behavior. As Deaton (1992, p. 14) notes,
however, “it is important to recognize that, at best, [the remaining expression]
only represents a fragment of lifetime preferences, albeit that fragment that is
‘live’ or ‘active’ for current decision-making.” An analysis of the welfare eﬀects
of policies that reallocate consumption and leisure across the life cycle requires
an explicit consideration of how individuals value past outcomes. If preferences
are time-consistent (βf = βb and δ =1 ) and there is no life-span uncertainty,
then individuals of all ages agree on the welfare ranking of policies. Thus,
one can make welfare comparisons solely on the basis of expected utility at
birth. This procedure implicitly assumes that the elderly value the past, and in
particular that they place the same value on outcomes in old age relative to those
in youth as does a newborn individual. The assumption that individuals place
no value on the past (βb = ∞) constitutes time inconsistency in preferences and
leads trivially to the conclusion that the elderly prefer a generous social security
system.12
If preferences are time-inconsistent, then a single individual can be viewed as
ac o l l e c t i o no fJ individuals, each of a diﬀe r e n ta g ea n de a c hw i t had i ﬀerent set
of preferences. These J individuals need not agree on their ranking of diﬀerent
consumption and labor sequences. Because of the well-known diﬃculties in mak-
ing interpersonal utility comparisons, it is unclear which of these J preference
orderings should be given priority in judging the welfare consequences of various
social security arrangements.13 Much of the recent literature on hyperbolic dis-
counting is concerned primarily with characterizing behavior rather than making
welfare comparisons, although a notable exception is Laibson, Repetto, and To-
bacman (1998). Feldstein (1985) does make such comparisons. In his model,
J =2and welfare rankings are based on the preferences of an agent in the ﬁnal
period of life. While arguably reasonable in the context of a 2-period model,
this retrospective welfare criterion seems quite arbitrary in the 65-period model
used here. Therefore, we use equation (2) to compute welfare measures at each
age, denoted by Wj∗ for j∗ =1 ,2,...,J,and we rank policy arrangements based
on these measures. Wj∗ is an average of the individual Uj∗,w h e r et h ea v e r a g -
ing is with respect to the stationary distribution of individuals of age j∗ across
employment and asset states. As might be expected, welfare measures viewed
from diﬀerent ages may disagree in their ranking of policy arrangements.
11See Laibson (1997).
12T h e r ei sal a r g el i t e r a t u r eo nh a b i tp e r s i s t e n c ei nw h i c ht h ep a s ti sr e l e v a n tn o to n l yf o r
welfare but also for current behavior.
13Strotz (1956) ﬁrst provided such a multi-agent interpretation of time-inconsistent prefer-
ences and pointed out the diﬃculty of arriving at an unambiguous welfare criterion.
10In addition, we compute a weighted average of the age-speciﬁc indicators
Wj∗, with the weight on each Wj∗ being the unconditional probability of sur-
viving from birth to age j∗. This aggregate welfare indicator is denoted W.
With time-consistent preferences, the appropriate welfare indicator is the ex-
pected lifetime utility of a newborn individual, W1,b e c a u s ea l lo ft h eo t h e r
indicators Wj∗ for j∗ > 1 are proportional to W1. This simple proportionality
relation breaks down if preferences are time-inconsistent, yet W retains a cer-
tain similarity to the expected utility of a newborn in the the time-consistent
case. Throughout its lifetime, each newborn individual with time-inconsistent
preferences will, depending on survival, become as many as J separate individ-
uals, each with its own preference ordering. W is simply the expected value of
the age-speciﬁc indicators Wj∗, where the expectation is taken with respect to
the unconditional survival probabilities. This criterion obeys Ramsey’s (1928)
stricture against pure time discounting of the wellbeing of future generations (or,
in this instance, selves), which he refers to as “a practice which is ethically inde-
fensible [that] arises merely from the weakness of the imagination.” W is also
an egalitarian criterion in the following sense. If a large cohort of N newborn
individuals is followed through life, it will ultimately constitute N individuals
of age 1, π2N individuals of age 2, π3N individuals of age 3, etc., where πj de-
notes the unconditional probability of surviving to age j. The welfare criterion
W assigns equal weights to the preferences of these (1 + π2 + π3 + ... + πJ)N
individuals.14






where γ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion and ϕ is the share of consump-
tion in utility.
2.3 Budget Constraints
Agents are subject to individual earnings uncertainty. An age-j individual faces
the state vector xj =( aj−1,s j,ej,h j−1), where aj−1 is the stock of assets held
at the end of age j−1, sj denotes the individual’s employment shock, ej denotes
the average past earnings at age j,a n dhj−1 indicates whether an individual has
elected to collect social security beneﬁts at age j−1. The individual employment
state sj ∈ S = {0,1} is assumed to follow a two-state, ﬁrst-order Markov
14With time-consistent preferences (βf = βb = β and δ =1 ) and in the absence of uncer-
tainty, equation (2) implies that the utility indicators Uj∗ attached to a given realization of
the consumption-leisure sequence are given by Uj∗ = β−(j∗−1)U1. Thus, assuming β < 1,
the Uj∗ grow at the rate β−1, so that simple aggregation of the Uj∗ across diﬀerent ages
would attach greater weight to the preferences of older selves. To avoid this bias, we compute
b Uj∗ = β
(j∗−1)
b Uj∗. With time-consistent preferences and no uncertainty, these normalized
utility indicators for a given realization of the consumption-leisure sequence thus reduce to
b Uj∗ = U1 for all j∗ > 1. The aggregate welfare measures Wj∗ and W are computed using
the normalized indicators b Uj∗.
11process. If sj =1 , the agent is given the opportunity to work and if sj =0the
agent is unemployed. The transition matrix for the employment shock is given
by the 2 × 2 matrix Π(s0,s)=[ πkl] where πkl = Prob{sj+1 = k|sj = l}. The
vector of choice variables is yj =( aj,c j,` j,h j) where aj indicates the stock of
assets held over to the next age, cj is consumption, `j is labor supply at age j,
and hj is the retirement decision which can only be made at or after the ﬁrst of
eligibility, jR.
The budget constraint facing an age-j individual is given by
cj + aj =( 1+r)aj−1 + sjwεj`j − Tj + hjQj + Mj + ξ, (4)
where r is the real interest rate,wi st h ew a g ep e re ﬃciency unit of labor, εj
is the eﬃciency index of an individual of age j, Tj i st a x e sp a i db ya na g e -
j individual,Q j and Mj are retirement and unemployment insurance beneﬁts
received by an age-j individual, respectively, and ξ is a per capita government




0 s =1 ,
φwεj`j s =0 , (5)
where φ is the unemployment insurance replacement ratio.
At any age j ≥ jR−1 individuals may make an irreversible decision to begin
collecting social security beneﬁts next period. This choice gives rise to a state
variable hj for agents of age jR or older. This variable takes a value of 1 for
agents who have elected to receive beneﬁts and a value of 0 for agents who have
not yet elected to do so.
Note that social security beneﬁts depend on individual earnings history. In
particular, we follow Huggett and Ventura (1999) and use the old-age beneﬁt
formula employed by the U.S. Social Security Administration. This involves a
two-step procedure. First, an individual’s average indexed monthly earnings
(AIME) are computed by keeping track of his average past earnings e and in-
dexing it to productivity growth. Next, the primary insurance amount (PIA)
is calculated using a concave formula which implements four replacement rates
along four segments of AIME. The PIA replaces 90% of the AIME along the
ﬁrst segment, 33% of the AIME along the second segment, 15% along the third
segment, and 0% beyond a maximum amount of AIME.15 The social security
policy parameter varied in our experiments is the tax rate. The replacement
rates along the diﬀerent segments of the beneﬁt formula are adjusted upward
or downward in equal proportion so that the system’s budget balances.
This hypothetical social security system mimics the actual U.S. system in
several important respects. Two members of the same cohort with the same
15The ﬁrst kink occurs at 16% of average total compensation, where as the second kink
takes place at 99% of average total compensation. The data on total compensation are taken
from Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, the Bureau of Labor
Statistics web site (average weekly earnings), and the National Income and Product Accounts
(supplements to wages and salaries).
12earnings history receive identical and constant real beneﬁts throughout their re-
tirement years. However, an otherwise identical retiree who is one year younger
receives a pension that is higher than the older retiree by a factor equal to the
rate of productivity growth. The beneﬁt formula incorporates a partial linkage
between beneﬁts and lifetime labor earnings. Finally, elderly individuals may
continue to work with no reduction of beneﬁts. Although this assumption is
consistent with the most recent legislation on this issue, it appears not to have
ag r e a te ﬀect on the welfare eﬀects of social security.16
Taxes paid satisfy
Tj = τccj + τaraj−1 +( τ` + τs + τu)wεj`j, (6)
where τc, τa, τ`, τs, and τu denote the tax rates for consumption, capital
income, labor income, social security and unemployment insurance, respectively.
Individuals are assumed to face borrowing constraints:
aj ≥ 0, ∀j. (7)
2.4 Individual’s Dynamic Program
We will restrict attention to Markov Equilibria and therefore rely on recursive
methods to characterize them.17 Let D = {d1,d 2,...,d m} denote the discrete
grid of points on which asset holdings are required to fall. For any beginning-of-
period asset holding, employment status, average past earnings, and retirement
status x =( a,s,e,h) ∈ D×S×R+×{0,1}, deﬁne the constraint set of an age-j
agent Ωj(x) ∈ R4
+ as all quadreplets yj =( aj,c j,` j,h j) such that equations
(4), (5), (6) and (7) are satisﬁed for j =1 ,2,...,J.When preferences are time-
consistent, i.e. δ =1 , the individual’s dynamic program is a standard backward
recursion.18
When preferences are time-inconsistent, we have to attribute a particular
belief to the individual concerning how he thinks his future selves will behave.
We consider two cases. In one case, we assume that the individuals are naive
in the sense that they think that the future selves will solve the δ =1(time-
consistent) problem despite a history of violating this belief. It turns out that the
‘naive δ < 1’ case is not too much more diﬃcult. Let Vj(x) be the (maximized)
value of the objective function of an age-j agent with state x =( a,s,e,h).V j(x)
is computed as the solution to the dynamic program





,j =1 ,2,···,J, (8)
16In some unreported experiments retirement is mandatory in the sense that agents are
prohibited from working at age jR or later. The welfare eﬀects are qualitatively very similar
to the endogenous retirement case.
17Krusell and Smith (1999) also rely on the use of Markov equilibria in their inﬁnite-horizon,
consumption-saving study, whereas Bernheim, Ray, and Yeltekin (1999) allow for historical
path dependence in their study of inﬁnite-horizon saving behavior.
18See Sargent (1987) and Stokey and Lucas (1989).
13where the notation Es0 means that the expectation is over the distribution of s0.
In the program (8), the continuation payoﬀ e Vj(x) is computed for j =1 ,2,...,J
from






Note that for δ =1 ,V j and e Vj coincide for all j and the decision rules are time-
consistent. For δ < 1, however, the behavior represented by the decision rules
{Aj(x),C j(x),L j(x),H j(x)}
J
j=1 is time-inconsistent.19 A stationary solution to
this dynamic program will consist of a set of value functions {Vj(x)}
J
j=1 , decision
rules {Aj(x),C j(x),L j(x),H j(x)}
J
j=1 a n dm e a s u r e so fa g e n tt y p e s{λj(x)}
J
j=1 .







given an initial measure of agent types λ0(x).
Most of our computations rely on the alternative assumption that individuals
are aware that their future selves will not compute continuation payoﬀs e Vj(x)
according to the recursion shown above. Instead, they assume that their future
selves will also engage in quasi-hyperbolic discounting. This case requires more
care in computing the value functions and the policy rules. Deﬁne the value
functions from the ‘sophisticated δ < 1’p r o b l e mb yb Vj and the associated
policy functions by b cj,b `j,b aj,a n db hj. We can compute these functions from the
recursion







where the V ∗
j sequence is computed by
V ∗
j (x)=u(b cj, b `j)+βf b Vj+1(b cj+1,b `j+1),
and reﬂects the fact that this is not the usual continuation payoﬀ function in
the dynamic program since self j has no control over the choices of self j +1
and therefore must take the future self’s optimal plan as given. This explains
the absence of the ‘max’ operator in the above computation.20
Given these decision rules and an initial distribution of agents, we compute







19In recent work on time-inconsistent behavior, Gül and Pesendorfer (1999) propose an
alternative preference structure that is shown to satisfy the hypotheses of the Stokey and
Lucas (1987) theorems on the existence and characterization of resulting dynamic programs.
20See the Appendix for a detailed description of the computations for the ‘sophisticated
δ < 1’c a s e .
142.5 Aggregate Technology
The production technology of the economy is given by a constant returns to
scale Cobb-Douglas production function
Y = BK1−αLα, (9)
where α ∈ (0,1) is labor’s share of output, and K and L are aggregate inputs of
capital and labor, respectively. The total factor productivity parameter B>0
is assumed to grow at a constant, exogenously given rate, αρ > 0, implying that
steady-state per capita output grows at rate ρ. The aggregate capital stock
depreciates at the rate d. Firm maximization requires













There is an inﬁnitely lived government that taxes consumption and income from
labor and capital, makes purchases of goods, and maintains unfunded social
security and unemployment insurance programs that are self-ﬁnancing. These






























A government policy is a set of parameters {G,τc,τa,τ`,τs,φ}. An allocation is
g i v e nb yas e to fd e c i s i o nr u l e s{Aj(x),C j(x),L j(x),H j(x)}
J
j=1, and measures
of agent types {λj(x)}
J
j=1 . A price system is a pair {w,r}. A Stationary
Recursive Equilibrium is an allocation,aprice system and a government
policy such that
• the allocation solves the dynamic program for all individuals, given the
price system and government policy,
15• the allocation maximizes ﬁrms’ proﬁt by satisfying equations (10) and
(11),
• the allocation and government policy satisfy the government’s budget con-
straints (12), (13) and (14), and,
• the commodity market clears.
3 Calibration and Solution of the Model Econ-
omy
In order to obtain numerical solutions to the model, we must choose particular
values for the parameters. We calibrate our model under the assumption that
the model period is one year.
3.1 Demographic and Labor Market Parameters
Individuals are assumed to be born at the real-time age of 21, and they can
live a maximum of J =6 5years. After real-time age 85, death is certain21.
The sequence of conditional survival probabilities {ψj}J
j=1 is taken from Faber
(1982). The share of age groups in the population, µj, is calculated from the
relations µj = ψjµj−1/(1 + n),where
PJ
j=1 µj =1and n is the growth rate
of the population, which has averaged 1.2% per year in the United States over
the last ﬁfty years. The age at which agents become eligible for social security
beneﬁts, jR, is taken to be equal to 45, which corresponds to a real-time age of
65. The eﬃciency index εj is intended to provide a realistic cross-sectional age
distribution of wages at a point in time. This index is taken from Hansen (1993),
interpolated to in-between years, and normalized to average unity between ages
j =1and j = J. Note that we extended the eﬃciency proﬁle in the labor market
beyond age 45 by extrapolating the Hansen (1993) data to model age 65 and
then normalized the series to obtain an average of unity over j =1 ,2,...,65.
The unemployment insurance replacement ratio, φ, is taken to be 25% of the
employed wage. The employment transition probabilities are chosen to make
the probability of employment equal to 0.94, independent of the availability of








The average duration of unemployment is therefore 1/(1 − 0.94) = 1.0638
model periods.22
21This assumption does not appear to be crucial; according to Faber (1982), we are leaving
out less than 3% of the U.S. population.
22Although the unemployment rate of 0.06 is close to the postwar U.S. average, the duration
clearly exceeds that in the U.S. economy. Incorporating persistence in unemployment would
further increase its average duration.
163.2 Preference Parameters
In line with recent practice, we set the preference parameters βf, δ,a n dγ so
as to match the economy’s observed wealth accumulation behavior as measured
by an empirical wealth-output ratio of 2.52.23 This single ratio is not suﬃcient
to pin down the values of all three preference parameters. The wealth-output
ratio in our model economy is positively related to the discount factors βf and
δ and negatively related to the risk aversion coeﬃcient γ. Mehra and Prescott
(1985) cite various empirical studies which suggest that the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion, γ, is between 1 and 2. We take γ =2as our base case and also
consider γ =1and γ =3as alternatives. We choose various values of δ ap r i o r i ,
and for each combination of γ and δ we search over values of βf to ﬁnd the one
which best matches the observed wealth-output ratio. In this search, we assume
as o c i a ls e c u r i t yt a xr a t eo f10% and an unemployment insurance replacement
rate of 25%. We take the share of consumption in the utility function, ϕ, to
be 0.33. This value yields an average labor input of about 0.29 at the assumed
10% social security tax rate and 25% unemployment insurance replacement
rate for all values of the other preference parameters that we considered. The
parameter βb does not aﬀect any observable quantities, so we choose diﬀerent
v a l u e sap r i o r it oe x a m i n et h ee ﬀect of various degrees of time inconsistency on
lifetime utility as viewed from diﬀerent ages.
3.3 Technology Parameters
The parameters describing production technology are chosen to match long-run
features of the U.S. economy along the lines suggested by Cooley and Prescott
(1995). The growth rate of per capita output ρ, is set to 0.0165, which is the
average growth rate of output per labor hour between 1897 and 1992. The
remaining technology parameters α and d are calculated from annual data since
1954. Our calculations imply a factor share of 0.690 for labor and an aggregate
depreciation rate of capital of 0.044. The technology parameter B, is normalized
to obtain an output of 1.0 in the model’s ‘base period’. The exact value of B
required for this normalization depends on the values of preference parameters
but is always between 1.76 and 1.78. Per capita quantities in this economy
grow at a rate of ρ per period.
3.4 Government
We calibrate the tax rate on consumption as 5.5%, the tax rate on interest earn-
ings as 40%, and the tax rate on labor income as 20% . Government purchases
of goods and services are set to 18% of output for the base case. In the experi-
ments where we vary the social security tax rate we keep all the other tax rates
and the level of government purchases constant.
Table 1 summarizes the parameter values of our benchmark model.





population growth rate n 0.012
maximum age J 65
retirement age jR 45
conditional survival probabilities ψj Faber (1982)
eﬃciency proﬁle εj Hansen(1993)
Technology
labor share parameter α 0.690
depreciation rate d 0.044
per capita output growth rate ρ 0.0165
Preferences
forward-looking subjective discount factor βf *
backward-looking subjective discount factor βb *
quasi-hyperbolic discounting parameter δ *
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion γ *
consumption share parameter ϕ 0.33
Government
tax rate on consumption τc 0.055
tax rate on capital income τa 0.40
tax rate on labor income τ` 0.20
unemployment insurance replacement ratio φ 0.25
government purchases G 0.18
* Parameter takes on various values as described in Sections 3.2, 4.1, and 4.2
3.5 Solution Method
In most of our simulations, the discrete set D = {d1,d2,....,dm} for asset values
is chosen so that d1 =0and m =4 0 9 7 . The upper bound dm i ss e ts ot h a ti ti s
never binding, typically a value of 20 times the annual income of an employed
agent.24 We rely on linear interpolation of the value functions so that the choice
variables that enter the utility function are essentially continuous variables,
yielding nearly-continuous policy functions.
To compute the measures of agent types, we do not use the forward recursion
described in the deﬁnition of the recursive stationary equilibrium. Although the
forward recursion leads to the same outcome and has the beneﬁt of expositional
clarity, the alternative of simulating histories of a large number of individuals has
computational advantages. In particular, we follow ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu,
and Joines (1998) to calculate the summary statistics of the model economies
24Note that with our choice of m =4 0 9 7 , t h es t a t es p a c eh a s4097×2 points for individuals
who are young and 4097×2×2 points for individuals who are eligible to collect social security
beneﬁts. The discrete-state numerical method used in this paper to obtain the policy functions
is quite standard. See ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, and Joines (1995), ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu (1998) and
the ‘Practical Dynamic Programming’ chapter in Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998).
18from these simulations. We start with a newly born agent and randomly draw
the employment state and the survival outcome. Given these realizations, we
use the optimal policy functions to generate next period’s endogenous state vari-
ables.25 We recursively follow this procedure until we receive a death realization,
which occurs no later than age 85. We replicate this procedure for a large num-
ber of individuals and compute the summary statistics as averages across the
replications. We replicated 100,000 agent histories to match the resulting cohort
shares to those calibrated for the U.S. economy.
Our computations start with a guess for the aggregate capital stock, labor
input, government transfers and social security beneﬁts, solve the individuals’
dynamic program to obtain the optimal policy functions, simulate a large num-
ber of agent histories, compute the average quantities and check whether they
are close to the initial guesses. If so, we have a stationary recursive equilibrium;
if not, we iterate on this procedure until convergence.
4R e s u l t s
We start this section by examining some of the properties of an economy in
which all individuals exhibit time-consistent preferences and behavior (βb = βf
and δ =1 ). This economy is calibrated to yield a capital-output ratio of 2.52
at a social security tax rate of 10%. Table 2 shows the properties of the steady
state of this economy at various social security tax rates. With a 10% tax
rate, the steady-state consumption-output ratio is 0.635 and the investment-
output ratio is 0.183. Because this is a closed economy, the investment-output
ratio is also the saving rate. As the social security tax rate is lowered toward
zero, we observe a monotonic increase in the capital stock, investment, and
consumption. Complete elimination of the pay-as-you-go social security system
raises the saving rate to 0.216 and generates 32% more capital, 12% higher




τs (%) wrYCIKL C V (%)
0 2.565 0.060 1.120 0.698 0.242 3.331 0.301 0.00
2 2.522 0.064 1.092 0.684 0.227 3.127 0.298 1.06
4 2.487 0.068 1.068 0.672 0.215 2.962 0.296 2.19
6 2.455 0.071 1.046 0.661 0.205 2.817 0.294 3.39
8 2.419 0.075 1.022 0.648 0.194 2.665 0.291 4.84
10 2.384 0.079 1.000 0.635 0.183 2.522 0.289 6.91
γ =2 .0, βf =1 .00588, δ =1 .0,B=1 .765
25We rely on linear interpolation at this stage also to ensure continuity of both the state
and the control variables.
19The last column of Table 2 examines the welfare at birth of an individual
born into the steady state corresponding to each social security tax rate. The
relevant welfare criterion is expected lifetime utility as viewed from age 21,
the ﬁrst period of economic life in our model. This criterion, denoted W21,
is described in Section 2.2 and is based on equation (2). According to this
criterion, welfare is maximized at a zero tax rate. We can measure the welfare
cost of being born into an economy with social security as the consumption
supplement (compensating variation) needed to equate the welfare of a newborn
individual in that economy to the welfare of an individual born into an economy
with no social security. The compensating variation is computed as a ﬁxed
percentage increase in consumption at each age. The last column of Table 2
shows these compensating variations, denoted CV. The welfare cost increases
faster than linearly in the tax rate so that at a tax rate of 10%, individuals
would require an increase in annual consumption of 6.91% to compensate them
for living in a world with unfunded social security.
If there were no possibility of dying before the maximum possible age J,t h e n
the compensating variation for agents with time-consistent preferences would
b et h es a m ew h e nv i e w e df r o ma n ya g e . T h ea g e - s p e c i ﬁc welfare criteria Wj∗
deﬁned in Section 2.2, however, are contingent on survival to age j∗.T h e s e
criteria sum the utility derived from realized consumption and leisure up through
age j∗ and the expected utility of future consumption and leisure, where the
expectation discounts for mortality risk. A pay-as-you-go social security system
taxes all workers but pays beneﬁts only to those who survive to retirement,
eﬀectively raising the rate of return to survivors. Because of this actuarial
reward for survival, it is possible that individuals who reach suﬃciently advanced
ages might prefer social security even if a newborn individual does not. This
turns out not to be the case for the economy described here, as Wj∗ is maximized
at a social security tax rate of zero for all j∗. Table 3 displays the compensating
variation required to make individuals of selected ages indiﬀerent between living
in an economy with a social security tax rate of 10% and an economy with no
social security. Although individuals of all ages prefer a world without social
security, the intensity of their aversion declines with age, reﬂecting the reward
to survival. The fact that even the elderly do not favor unfunded social security
is due primarily to the eﬀects of such a system in lowering the aggregate capital
stock and lifetime earnings and consumption.
Table 3
Welfare Costs of 10%






204.1 Time-Inconsistent Preferences and Behavior
We now consider a world populated by quasi-hyperbolic discounters (βb = βf
and δ < 1) who exhibit a form of time inconsistency in preferences that leads to
time inconsistency in behavior. Preferences of this sort are characterized by a
current one-period discount rate that is higher than future one-period discount
rates. This high short-term impatience leads quasi-hyperbolic discounters to
postpone saving, and continual deferral may lead these individuals to enter
retirement with substantially lower assets than exponential discounters.
4.1.1 The Eﬀect of Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting on Saving
If social security is to constitute a welfare-improving policy intervention in
an economy with this sort of time inconsistency but not in a world of time-
consistent preferences, one would expect to ﬁnd an economically signiﬁcant dif-
ference in saving behavior between quasi-hyperbolic discounters and exponential
discounters. To see whether this is the case, we run a “counterfactual” experi-
ment on the exponential economy summarized in Table 2. Speciﬁcally, we vary
the quasi-hyperbolic discounting parameter δ while setting all other parameters
to the values used in the exponential economy. The social security tax rate is
set to 10%. This experiment is counterfactual in that these economies fail to
replicate the empirical capital-output ratio of 2.52 when δ < 1.
If δ < 1, the optimal policy functions derived at age j∗ for ages j0 >j ∗
will no longer be optimal when an individual arrives age j0. As a consequence
the age-j0 individual will in general deviate from the policy rules derived at any
earlier age. We assume that individuals are aware of this feature of their own
behavior and that they choose current consumption, saving, and work eﬀort
optimally, taking into account the behavior of their future selves.
Table 4 summarizes the results of varying δ. The levels of output, con-
sumption, and capital are normalized to 100.0 in the exponential economy. The
results indicate that quasi-hyperbolic discounting does indeed have a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on saving. When δ =0 .90, the steady-state capital stock is about 12.5%
below its value in the exponential economy, and a δ of 0.85 causes the capi-
tal stock to fall almost 20% below the level in the exponential economy. The
magnitude of these eﬀects does not depend in any important way on the social
security tax rate. For example, in an economy without social security, a value
of δ =0 .90 results in a steady-state capital stock 13% below that obtained with
δ =1 .0.
Table 4
Eﬀects of Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting
δ YCK K / Y wr
1.00 100.0 100.0 100.0 2.52 2.38 0.079
0.90 94.8 95.4 87.4 2.33 2.30 0.089
0.85 91.9 93.0 81.5 2.24 2.26 0.095






























Figure 1: Age-Asset Holding Proﬁles for Diﬀerent Values of δ
Figure 1 displays the age-asset proﬁles for these three economies. The
highest proﬁle corresponds to δ =1 .0 and the lowest to δ =0 .85.
4.1.2 Social Security in a World of Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting
Having established the eﬀect of quasi-hyperbolic discounting on saving, we
now ask how much social security can improve welfare in such a world. As
with the exponential economy described in Table 2, we require that economies
with quasi-hyperbolic discounters and a 10% social security tax rate generate a
capital-output ratio that matches the historical U.S. average. We do this by
appropriately choosing the standard discount factor βf for each value of δ so
that each (βf, δ) pair results in a capital-output ratio of 2.52. We then examine
the eﬀects of varying the social security tax rate.
Before reporting the results of our social security experiments, however, we
ﬁrst establish a benchmark against which to compare the welfare eﬀects of dif-
ferent tax rates. As our benchmark we consider a world in which individuals
have a technology that allows them to commit at age 20 to a state-contingent
path of lifetime consumption and work eﬀort. From age 21 until death, these
individuals follow decision rules that are the same as those implied by δ =1 ,
and they eﬀectively overcome the short-term impatience implied by δ < 1.
22Table 5 summarizes the consequences of a perfect commitment technology
for three conﬁgurations of preference parameters that we consider in more detail
below. The table ﬁrst reports the levels of capital, output, and consumption,
each scaled relative to a value of 100.0 in the no-commitment case without social
security. It then gives the value of the commitment technology, expressed as
a ﬁxed percentage increase in consumption at each age in the no-commitment
case that makes individuals as well oﬀ as having the commitment device. These
compensating variations are computed using preferences as viewed from four dif-
ferent ages. The commitment technology results in higher steady-state levels
of capital, output, and consumption, and the increase in consumption is con-
centrated during retirement years.
Table 5
Perfect Commitment Technology
γ =2 .0 γ =1 .0
δ =0 .90 δ =0 .85 δ =0 .90
A. Behavior
K 114.0 121.3 116.1
Y 105.2 107.6 105.8
C 103.4 104.9 103.7
B. Compensating Variation
W21 3.28 4.49 3.74
W41 3.20 4.62 3.75
W61 3.25 4.50 3.73
W81 4.68 7.07 5.09
Figure 2 shows the age-consumption proﬁles for the economy with γ =2 .0
and δ =0 .90 in the absence of social security, both with and without the com-
mitment device. Both behavior and welfare seem more sensitive to the quasi-
hyperbolic discounting parameter than to the inverse elasticity of intertemporal
substitution. These results indicate that the steady-state welfare costs to quasi-
hyperbolic discounters of their time-inconsistent behavior are substantial.26
We now examine the eﬀectiveness of unfunded social security as a substitute
for a perfect commitment technology in maintaing old-age consumption. Table
6 summarizes the economic eﬀects of varying the social security tax rate in
economies in which the preference parameters βf, γ,a n dδ take on diﬀerent
26Laibson (1997, p. 467) reports compensating variations that are much smaller than those
in Table 5. There appear to be two reasons for the diﬀerence. First, Laibson’s welfare analysis
is for a partial commitment technology that takes the form of an illiquid asset. Second, his
analysis is for an inﬁnitely-lived representative agent and includes the change in consumption
during the transition from one steady state to another, whereas our comparison is only of the
two steady states. Barro (1999, p. 1139) examines the value of perfect commitment. Because
he takes into account the transition between steady states, he reports a smaller welfare eﬀect
for a given change in steady-state capital than we do. Assuming log utility, he ﬁnds that the
value of commitment is small unless the degree of short-term impatience is high.























Figure 2: Age-Consumption Proﬁles with and without Commitment
values. The last two parameters are speciﬁed a priori, and βf is then chosen to
yield a capital-output ratio of 2.52. Our central value for γ, the inverse elasticity
of intertemporal substitution, is 2.0. Given γ =2 .0, the quasi-hyperbolic
discounting parameter δ takes on values of 1.00 (the exponential case from Table
1), 0.90, and 0.85. In addition, we consider values of γ of 1.0 and 3.0, each
paired with a δ of 0.90. The table is normalized so that capital, output, and
consumption are all 100.0 when the social security tax rate is 10%, reﬂecting
t h ef a c tt h a ta l lﬁve economies have been calibrated to yield the same values of
these three aggregates.
Social security reduces the steady-state values of capital, output, and con-
sumption in each of the economies considered. The results for γ =2 .0 indicate
that the capital stock would be about 1/3 larger in the absence of social secu-
rity. The magnitude of this eﬀe c ti ss i m i l a ra c r o s st h et h r e ev a l u e so fδ, although
it is somewhat more pronounced with quasi-hyperbolic discounting. A lower
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (γ =3 .0) implies a larger eﬀect of social
security on steady-state capital, while γ =1 .0 implies a smaller eﬀect. The
smaller the elasticity of substitution, the greater the reduction in the saving
of workers when the government attempts to reallocate consumption toward
retirement years through the payroll tax.
24Table 6
Eﬀects of Social Security with Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting
γ =2 .0 γ =3 .0 γ =1 .0
τs(%) δ =1 .00 δ =0 .90 δ =0 .85 δ =0 .90 δ =0 .90
A. Capital
0 132.0 134.0 136.4 145.7 123.1
2 123.9 125.0 126.8 133.3 119.0
4 117.4 117.7 118.7 123.2 114.6
6 111.7 111.6 111.9 114.6 109.3
8 105.6 105.6 105.5 107.1 104.3
10 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
B. Output
0 112.2 112.9 114.0 116.4 109.5
2 109.4 109.8 110.6 112.5 107.8
4 107.0 107.2 107.6 109.9 106.0
6 104.8 104.8 104.9 105.8 103.8
8 102.4 102.4 102.4 102.8 101.8
10 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
C. Consumption
0 109.9 110.5 111.3 112.6 108.4
2 107.8 108.2 108.9 110.0 106.7
4 105.9 106.2 106.5 107.3 105.3
6 104.1 104.2 104.4 104.9 103.4
8 102.1 102.1 102.1 102.4 101.5
10 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
D. Other Parameter Values
βf 1.0058 1.0117 1.0146 1.0261 0.9980
B 1.7652 1.7740 1.7880 1.7766 1.7625
We can now use these economies to examine the welfare consequences of
social security. Although the eﬀect of social security on aggregate consumpton
does not seem very sensitive to the value of the quasi-hyperbolic discounting
parameter, there are two reasons why the welfare eﬀects might still depend on
δ. First, social security aﬀects not only aggregate consumption but also its
allocation over the life cycle, and these intertemporal reallocations might diﬀer
across the three values of δ considered. Second, individuals with diﬀerent δ’s
have diﬀerent preferences, so they value a given lifetime consumpton sequence
diﬀerently. In addition, the welfare eﬀects might depend on γ. A sharp decline
in old-age consumption due to quasi-hyperbolic discounting might have higher
welfare costs, and social security might lead to correspondingly larger welfare
gains (at least as viewed from old age), the lower the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution. But as we have seen, a low elasticity of substitution also raises
the costs of social security, which take the form of lower steady-state capital
and lifetime consumption.
25As noted in Section 2.2, with time-inconsistent preferences we can view a
single individual as a collection of J individuals, each of a diﬀerent age and
each with a diﬀerent set of preferences. Since these J individuals need not agree
on their ranking of diﬀerent consumption and labor sequences, we use equation
(2) to compute welfare measures Wj∗ for each age j∗ =1 ,2,...J.F o r s o c i a l
security tax rates between 2% and 10%, we determine the ﬁrst ageb j at which Wb j
is greater with social security than without. (It turns out in our experiments
that if social security raises welfare as viewed from age b j,i ta l s or a i s e sw e l f a r e
as viewed from any age j>b j.) We also calculate the fraction of the population
falling into ages j ≥ b j.
Table 7 reports these welfare calculations for three of the ﬁve economies
summarized in Table 6. We omit the exponential economy, where even a 2%
social security tax rate lowers welfare as viewed from all ages, and the economy
with γ =3 .0, where a social security tax rate as high as 10% lowers welfare as
viewed from any age.27 In the remaining economies, we ﬁnd that social security
raises the welfare of quasi-hyperbolic discounters as viewed from suﬃciently
advanced ages. With γ =2 .0, the fraction of the population falling into these
cohorts never exceeds about 5%, however. With γ =1 .0, a 4% social security
tax rate increases welfare as viewed from ages 70 and greater, corresponding to
more than 10% of the population. The aggregate welfare measure W,w h i c h
weights each of the age-speciﬁc indicators Wj∗ by the unconditional probability
of surviving to age j∗, is always higher without social security than with any
of the tax rates considered here. Overall, these results indicate that unfunded
social security is not particularly eﬀective in correcting for the undersaving
resulting from quasi-hyperbolic preferences, at least for the degrees of myopia
considered here.
Table 7
Who Prefers Social Security?
γ =2 .0 γ =1 .0
δ =0 .90 δ =0 .85 δ =0 .90
τs(%) Age Share (%) Age Share (%) Age Share (%)
2 81 1.98 79 3.06 72 8.29
4 7 74 . 3 2 7 74 . 3 2 7 0 1 0 . 2 0
6 76 5.02 76 5.02 73 7.40
8 80 2.50 79 3.06 76 6.56
10 — 0.00 82 1.51 82 1.51
In light of the apparently widely held view that social security may raise
the welfare of short-sighted individuals who fail to save adequately for their re-
tirement, the question arises as to why our model implies such meager welfare
27With γ =3 .0, welfare as viewed from age 85 is maximized with a tax rate of 6%, but
welfare as viewed from any other age is higher with no social security than with any of the
tax rates we have examined.























Figure 3: Age-Consumption Proﬁles with and without Social Security
gains. Table 6 has already documented that unfunded social security depresses
steady-state capital, output, and consumption, and these eﬀects are if anything
stronger with quasi-hyperbolic discounting than in a pure exponential economy.
I ft h ec o n s u m p t i o nd e c l i n ei no l da g ew e r es u ﬃciently great in the absence of
social security, and if social security were suﬃciently eﬀective in reallocating
consumption from working years to retirement, the welfare gains from this re-
allocation might outweigh the losses from lower lifetime consumption. Table 8
and Figure 3 examine this issue.
The ﬁgure shows age-consumption proﬁles for individuals with γ =2 .0 and
δ =0 .90 at social security tax rates of zero and 10%.28 Like the commitment
technology shown in Figure 2, social security raises old-age consumption, but
28With social security, simulated consumption exhibits a discrete drop at retirement similar
to that documented by Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg (1997) and Banks, Blundell, and
Tanner (1998). In our model, the institutional features of social security cause an increase in
the eﬀective labor income tax rate at age 65 which is similar to that occurring when people
reach their early 60s in the U.S. system. This increase in the eﬀective tax rate causes a
discrete reduction in hours worked which is not observed in the absence of social security.
Because individuals smooth a composite of leisure and market goods, a sudden increase in
leisure is accompanied by a drop in consumption expenditures. Bernheim, Skinner, and
Weinberg have noted that any drop in consumption at retirement could be associated with a
reduction in work-related expenditures that might be more properly deducted from earnings
rather counted as consumption. Because of the one-good nature of our model, we are unable
27unlike the commitment technology, it does so at the cost of noticeably reduced
consumption during working years. The table reports average consumption
levels for the last decade before retirement, the ﬁrst decade after retirement, and
two periods of extreme old age for each of the three economies with γ =2 .0.
Consumption is normalized to 100.0 in the decade before retirement in the




δ =1 .00 δ =0 .90 δ =0 .85
Age τs = 0.0 τs = 0.1 τs = 0.0 τs = 0.1 τs = 0.0 τs = 0.1
55-64 100.0 97.7 100.0 96.7 100.0 95.3
65-74 106.6 108.3 105.3 105.8 105.3 104.3
75-81 95.8 112.6 88.9 106.1 85.6 100.2
82-85 81.4 101.3 65.5 81.7 62.9 76.0
Without social security, consumption peaks in the ﬁrst decade after retire-
ment and then declines below pre-retirement levels. Consumption of quasi-
hyperbolic discounters aged 82-85 is less than two thirds the pre-retirement level.
Social security reduces pre-retirement consumption in each economy, reﬂecting
the eﬀects of the payroll tax and lower lifetime earnings, and the reduction is
greater for quasi-hyperbolic discounters. Consumption in the ﬁrst decade after
retirement rises or falls slightly as a result of the 10% tax rate, depending on the
value of δ. Social security has its greatest eﬀect on consumption in extreme old
age. In all three economies, a tax rate of 10% results in consumption at ages
75-81 that is noticeably above the pre-retirement level.29 The story is diﬀerent
among the very oldest individuals, however. Although social security raises
the consumption of quasi-hyperbolic discounters aged 82-85, the eﬀect is not
large enough to prevent a substantial shortfall relative to pre-retirement levels.
Individuals with δ =0 .90 drive their asset holdings to less than 20% of annual
consumption by age 81, and those with δ =0 .85 reach even lower asset levels
even sooner. In constrast, the consumption of exponential discounters at ages
to address this question, and our ﬁnding is due solely to a substitution between leisure and
market goods in general.
29Consumption in our model, either with or without social security, seems to peak later
than in the data. One potential explanation is age dependence in the period utility function
u(cj,` j), possibly due to changes in household composition. This age dependence would
aﬀect the shape of the age-consumption proﬁle that maximizes lifetime utility as viewed from
any age, and it would similarly aﬀect the age-consumption proﬁl et h a tw o u l db ec h o s e ni n
advance by an individual who could perfectly commit to a given path. The welfare loss from
myopic behavior results from discrepancies between this optimal path and the one actually
followed. We have not attempted to incorporate age-speciﬁc taste shifters because measuring
them would be diﬃcult and because it seems unlikely that they would qualitatively aﬀect the
discrepancy between the optimal and actual consumption paths.
2882-85 remains above the pre-retirement level.30 Quasi-hyperbolic discounters
have higher consumption in extreme old age with the commitment technology
shown in Figure 2 than with a 10% social security tax rate.
Table 8 indicates that social security does eﬀect a redistribution of consump-
tion from working to retirement years, but the beneﬁts of this reallocation are
apparently not suﬃcient to outweigh the cost of lower steady-state capital and
lifetime earnings. Because these are closed economies, it is possible that the
reduction in the capital stock is overstated. To examine the sensitivity of our
ﬁndings to the closed-economy assumption, we analyze open-economy variants
of the three economies of Table 7, in each of which social security led to welfare
gains as viewed from old age. We assume that the world capital-output ratio
is equal to 2.52, the value to which each of these economies is calibrated when
the social security tax rate is 10%. The domestic capital-output ratio remains
ﬁxed at this level, and the wage rate and the interest rate remain ﬁxed as we
vary the tax rate. Changes in the ﬁnancial wealth of domestic residents cause
one-to-one changes in net foreign assets.
Table 9 shows the eﬀects of social security on various economic aggregates in
these three small, open economies. The income measure reported in the table
is GNP, which includes the return on assets held abroad. Each aggregate is
normalized to 100.0 with a tax rate of 10%. The eﬀects are fairly robust across
the diﬀerent parameterizations reported in the table, and they indicate that the
depressing eﬀect of social security on total asset holdings is roughly three times
a sl a r g ei na no p e ne c o n o m ya si nac l o s e do n e . A st h es o c i a ls e c u r i t yt a x
rate is raised in a closed economy, the reduction in the capital stock raises the
interest rate, which in turn mitigates the reduction in saving. The return to
saving is ﬁxed in the small, open economy, however, and does not tend to damp
the change in asset accumulation. The eﬀect of social security on GNP and
aggregate consumption is about the same in these small, open economies as in
their closed-economy counterparts.
30It is curious that the consumption of quasi-hyperbolic discounters drops so sharply a few
years before the certain death date of 85. One explanation for this phenomenon is that these
individuals simply require about 15 years to exhaust their retirement assets. An alternative is
that impending mortality exacerbates their high short-term impatience, causing them to run
down their assets a few years before certain death. To help us distinguish between these two
explanations, we simulated a version of the model with δ =0 .90 and 75 periods (a maximum
real-time age of 95). Individuals in this model drove their asset levels to 16% of annual
consumption by age 82, tending to support the former explanation. Thus, the precipitous
drop in the consumption of quasi-hyperbolic discounters in their early 80s does not seem to
be merely an artifact of the certain death date.
























Figure 4: Age-Consumption Proﬁles in a Small, Open Economy
Table 9
Social Security in an Open Economy
τs =0 .0
τs =0 .1 γ =2 .0 γ =1 .0
δ =0 .90 δ =0 .85 δ =0 .90
Assets 100.0 199.6 195.8 187.0
GNP 100.0 112.9 112.5 116.2
Consumption 100.0 110.5 110.3 106.5
The eﬀects of unfunded social security in enhancing welfare and reallocating
consumption from working to retirement years are weaker in an open economy
than in a closed one. In each of the open economies in Table 9, lifetime utility
as viewed from all ages is higher without social security than with any tax rate
we have examined.
Figure 4 shows the age-consumption proﬁles for tax rates of zero and 10%
with γ =2 .0 and δ =0 .90. Because the interest rate is unchanged, these two
consumption proﬁles have approximately the same shape, and social security
results in a roughly proportional decline in consumption at all ages. Compare
this with the closed-economy proﬁles in Figure 3. It appears that the eﬀect
of social security in reallocating consumption to retirement years in the closed
30economy is largely an endogenous response to the increase in the interest rate,
which steepens the age-consumption proﬁle.
4.1.3 Non-optimizing Agents
It might be argued that the individuals we have considered thus far are not very
myopic. First, they are rather sophisticated in recognizing the time inconsis-
tency resulting from their preference structure, and they optimize given those
preferences. In this sense, they are not short-sighted at all. Second, the degree
of myopia as represented by δ might not be large enough to generate serious
welfare consequences. Concerning this second point, the results in Tables 4
and 5 above suggest that both the behavioral and the welfare consequences of
a δ in the neighborhood of 0.85 to 0.90 can be signiﬁcant. Nevertheless, Laib-
son, Repetto, and Tobacman (1998) have argued that experimental evidence
supports values of δ closer to 0.60, and the scope for social security to improve
welfare might be substantially greater with a lower δ. As Laibson, Repetto,
and Tobacman have also pointed out, however, it is diﬃcult if not impossible
to compute equilibria of models with sophisticated agents whose values of δ are
substantially lower than those we have considered.
Some of the literature on myopia has made a distinction between optimiz-
ing but time-inconsistent behavior of the sort we have considered and a more
fundamental failure to plan for the future.31 There are many ways in which
individuals could fail to optimize, and we do not propose to consider a long list
of possibilities. We do examine one such candidate, however. Speciﬁcally, we
consider individuals with preferences as given in equation (2) who naively think
that their future selves will adhere to optimal plans derived today. Because
these naive individuals have the same preferences as the relatively sophisticated
ones considered above, social security will have diﬀerent welfare eﬀects on the
two types of agents only to the extent that they behave diﬀerently.
It is not clear a priori whether naive agents save less than sophisticated ones
with the same preferences. A sophisticated individual will save more than a
naive one in order to achieve any target level of wealth farther than one period
into the future, because the sophisticated individual realizes that his proﬂigate
intermediate self will tend to consume any assets set aside for the more distant
future. On the other hand, a dollar of saving is more valuable relative to a dollar
of current consumption if the assets will be consumed optimally (as viewed by
the current individual) over time rather than dissipated on consumption in the
near future. Therefore, saving will appear more attractive to a quasi-hyperbolic
discounter who naively believes that his future selves will optimally allocate
31For example, Laibson (1996, p. 4; 1997, p. 449) and Barro (1999, p. 1127) distinguish be-
tween the model with sophisticated quasi-hyperbolic discounters and that of Akerlof (1991), in
which “the standard assumption of rational, forward-looking, utility maximizing is violated.”
Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg (1997, pp. 14, 20) contrast both the standard life-cycle
model and the quasi-hyperbolic model of sophisticated agents with a world in which individ-
uals operate “outside the framework of rational, farsighted optimization” and “engage in a
variety of heuristic and quasi-rational strategies to determine their saving prior to retirement
(or simply procrastinate, as in Akerlof, 1991).”
31additional resources over time than to a more sophisticated agent who realizes
that this is not the case.
To isolate the consequences of the computational mistakes made by quasi-
hyperbolic discounters who fail to take into account their future behavior, we
examine three economies populated by naive agents with the same preferences
as those in Table 7. It turns out to be rather straightforward to compute
the policy functions for naive agents with values of δ much lower than those
considered thus far. Therefore, we allow for still more severe myopia by also
considering economies populated by naive individuals with δ =0 .60,w h i c hi s
the benchmark value in Laibson (1996).
The diﬀerence in behavior between naive and sophisticated individuals is
greater without than with social security, and among the three sets of preference
parameters from Table 7, the diﬀerence is greatest with δ =2and γ =0 .85.
With those preferences and no social security, the capital stock is 3.4% lower and
aggregate consumption is 0.9% lower in an economy with naive agents than with
sophisticated ones. Furthermore, the two types of agents allocate consumption
across the life cycle in an almost identical manner. As a result, the welfare
consequences of social security are qualitatively the same in the two economies.
A 10% social security tax rate raises the welfare of naive individuals as viewed
from ages 80 and above (2.5% of the population), compared with ages 82 and
above (1.5% of the population) for sophisticated individuals.
We now consider a world populated by naive quasi-hyperbolic discounters
with preference parameters γ =2and δ =0 .60. To establish the eﬀects of
such extreme myopia on saving behavior, we ﬁrst conduct the counterfactual
experiment of introducing δ =0 .60 into the exponential economy of Table 2,
holding all other parameter values ﬁxed. The resulting capital stock is 49.5%
of that in the exponential economy. To examine the welfare eﬀects of social
security in an economy with δ =0 .60, however, we must recalibrate the standard
time discount factor βf to 1.03905 so that this economy generates a capital-
output ratio of 2.52 when the social security tax rate is 10%.
Setting the tax rate to zero in this economy increases the steady-state values
of capital, output, and consumption by 19.9%, 8.6%, and 7.9%, respectively.
Thus, social security depresses saving less with δ =0 .60 than with the higher
values considered above. Figure 5 shows the age-consumption proﬁles in this
economy with tax rates of zero and 10%.
As can be seen, social security raises old-age consumption substantially more
than was the case with higher values of δ. This fact, combined with the smaller
eﬀect on the capital stock, means that a tax rate of 10% raises welfare as viewed
from all ages. Individuals in an economy with a 10% tax rate would sacriﬁce a
substantial fraction of annual consumption rather than give up social security
entirely. The compensating variations for various ages are shown in Table 10,
with negative numbers indicating a willingness to sacriﬁce consumption rather
than forego social security. Furthermore, the optimal tax rate as viewed from
all ages is substantially higher than the 10% value that approximates the current
U.S. system.























Figure 5: Age-Consumption Proﬁles for Naive Agents with δ =0 .6
Table 10
Welfare Costs of 10%






In summary, our model indicates that there is little scope for unfunded social
security to raise welfare in a world of sophisticated quasi-hyperbolic discoun-
ters with values of δ in the neighborhood of 0.85 to 0.90. Finding a welfare-
enhancing role requires more extreme myopia. Simply replacing sophisticated
agents with non-optimizing counterparts who fail to recognize the implications
of their own future preferences scarcely increases the beneﬁcial eﬀects of social
security, at least for δ in the range of 0.85 to 0.90. Social security does sig-
niﬁcantly raise the welfare of naive quasi-hyperbolic discounters with δ =0 .60,
however. We do not know whether this result would carry over to a world of
sophisticated agents with the same δ,a sw eh a v et h u sf a rb e e nu n a b l et os o l v e
such a model.
334.2 Time-Inconsistent Preferences, Time-Consistent Be-
havior
In the previous section, individuals had time-inconsistent preferences that led
to time-inconsistent behavior. In that environment, the welfare eﬀects of social
security depended much more on the time inconsistency in behavior than on
any age dependency in preferences per se. According to equation (2), an age-
J individual looking back from the last possible period of life places a weight





b times the weight placed on the period utility of consumption and
leisure at some later age j
0
. Now consider a hypothetical individual of age
21, the ﬁr s tp e r i o do fo u rp l a n n i n gp r o b l e m ,w h oc a nb ea s s u r e do fl i v i n gt o
age j
0
.I f βb = βf, as we have assumed thus far, this individual places the
same relative weights on the two period utilities as does the age-J individual
unless j∗ =2 1 ,i nw h i c hc a s eu(cj∗,` j∗) gets additional weight if δ < 1.I n
this sense, the diﬀerence in preferences between individuals in the ﬁrst and
last possible periods of economic life is not very great, even if δ < 1.I t i s
true that, according to equation (2), an individual looking toward the future
discounts for mortality risk, giving rise to a discrepancy between his preferences
and those of an older self conditional on survival. But we saw above that with
time-consistent behavior, this conditional age dependence in preferences was
insuﬃcient to make even the oldest individuals prefer social security.
We now consider a form of time inconsistency in preferences that allows more
scope for disagreement between the young and the old. In this speciﬁcation
δ =1 , so that behavior is time-consistent. But now βb > βf so that, even
apart from diﬀerences due to mortality risk, an individual places more weight on
u(cj
0,` j
0) relative to u(cj∗,` j∗) when looking back from age j
0
than when looking
forward from age j∗. Thus, an old individual may regret having consumed so
much when young. We deﬁn et h ed e g r e eo ft h i st y p eo fm y o p i a ,b σ ≥ 0, implicitly
by βb =1 /(1+σ−b σ),w h e r eσ is implicitly deﬁned by βf =1 /(1+σ). This form
of retrospective time inconsistency, or regret, has been considered by Feldstein
(1985) and Caplin and Leahy (1999).
Behavior depends on the preference parameters βf,γ,a n dδ but not on βb.
B e c a u s ew et a k eγ =2and δ =1 ,w es e tβf =1 .0058 to ensure a capital-output
ratio of 2.52 with a 10% social security tax rate. Thus, the behavior of this
economy is identical to that displayed in Table 2. Within this environment we
examine the welfare eﬀects, as viewed from diﬀerent ages, of varying the social
security tax rate. We restrict our experiment to tax rates of zero, 2%, 4%, ...,
10% and ask the following questions: For diﬀerent degrees of myopia b σ,w h a ti s
the earliest vantage point j∗ from which lifetime welfare is higher with a positive
social security tax rate than with a rate of zero and what is the earliest vantage
point j
0
from which a 10% tax rate is preferred to any of the other tax rates
under consideration?
Table 11 contains the answers to these questions. Individuals as young as
40 prefer some social security when the degree of myopia is as great as 8% per
34year. It turns out in our experiments that if an individual of age j∗ prefers a
given social security tax rate to zero, individuals of any greater age also prefer
that tax rate. In all of the cases we have considered, the optimal tax rate as
viewed from any age is either zero or at least 6%, with more modest rates never
being preferred. In order for a majority of the population to view a tax rate of
10% or more as optimal, the degree of myopia must be at least 10% per year.
Given our assumed value of βf, myopia of 10% implies βb =1 .1183,w h i c hi n
turn implies that the weight on past outcomes declines to 2/3 the weight on
current outcomes after about 3.5 years and to 1/3 after 10 years. While we
know of no empirical evidence on the magnitude of retrospective discounting,




Positive tax 10% tax
rate preferred rate preferred
b σ (%) Age Share (%) Age Share (%)
0 — 0.0 — 0.0
25 7 2 6 . 7 6 4 6 . 6
4 4 64 5 . 0 5 62 8 . 2
6 4 25 2 . 6 4 93 9 . 7
8 4 05 6 . 6 4 54 6 . 9
10 38 60.6 43 50.7
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this paper we examine the welfare eﬀects of unfunded social security on in-
dividuals who exhibit two distinct forms of time-inconsistent preferences. In
addition to incorporating quasi-hyperbolic discounting, our model nests the ret-
rospective form of time inconsistency analyzed by Feldstein (1985) and extends
his framework to include a wider range of beneﬁts and costs of social security. In
order to examine the role of social security in an economy with time-inconsistent
preferences, we construct a model which consists of overlapping generations of
65-period-lived individuals facing mortality risk, individual income risk, and
borrowing constraints. Private annuity markets and credit markets are closed
by assumption. Individuals in this economy are heterogenous with respect
to their age, employment status, retirement status, hours worked, and asset
holdings.
We consider two cases of quasi-hyperbolic discounting. First, we allow
for sophisticated behavior by assuming that agents take into account the fact
that their future selves will also engage in quasi-hyperbolic discounting. This
assumption on beliefs results in a game that the agent plays with the future
35selves. Second, we assume that agents are naive in the sense that they ignore
quasi-hyperbolic discounting by their future selves.
In this environment social security may provide additional utility for myopic
agents who regret their saving decisions when they ﬁnd themselves with low
consumption after retirement. In addition, social security may substitute for
missing private annuity markets in helping agents allocate consumption in the
face of uncertain life spans. On the other hand, social security distorts aggregate
saving and labor supply behavior and aﬀects the wage rate and the interest
rate. Consequently, whether or not social security is welfare enhancing even
for myopic agents is a quantitative question. Because individuals have time-
inconsistent preferences, it is necessary to evaluate lifetime welfare from diﬀerent
vantage points in the life cycle.
Our ﬁndings can be summarized as follows:
• With time-consistent preferences, the actuarial reward for survival that
social security provides is not quantitatively large enough to render a
world with social security desirable; there is a signiﬁcant welfare cost to
social security, viewed at any age, although the cost declines with age.
These ﬁndings are in accord with previous research.
• Quasi-hyperbolic discounting at the rate of 15% lowers the capital stock
by about 20% at any social security tax rate, and there are substantial
steady-state welfare costs to quasi-hyperbolic discounters of their time-
inconsistent behavior.
• Social security is a poor substitute for a perfect commitment technology
in maintaining old-age consumption; the capital stock would be about
one-third larger in the absence of social security than with a tax rate of
10%.
• In a world of quasi-hyperbolic discounters, sophisticated or naive, un-
funded social security generally does not raise welfare for short-term dis-
count rates of at least 15%.
• Social security does raise the welfare of naive quasi-hyperbolic discounters
with a short-term discount rate of 40%.
• With retrospective time inconsistency of the form considered by Feldstein
(1985) and Caplin and Leahy (1999), the ex ante annual discount rate
must be at least 10% greater than seems warranted ex post in order for a
majority of the population to prefer a social security tax rate of 10% to
no social security.
Overall, our quantitative ﬁndings question the eﬃcacy of unfunded social
security in correcting for the undersaving resulting from quasi-hyperbolic pref-
erences.
36Appendix
The remaining lifetime utility of an age-j agent exhibiting sophisticated
quasi-hyperbolic discounting, evaluated using age-j preferences, is






= u(b cj, b `j)+δβfEj
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fu(b cj+i+1, b `j+i+1)
)
.
The term in braces looks like the standard Vj+1 from the δ =1problem, in
which case the solutions would be the same as in the ‘naive δ < 1’ case. But
the term in braces does not equal Vj+1 because the consumption and leisure
sequences are not the same as that resulting from the δ =1problem, and
sophisticated agents take this into account. The task is to ﬁnd a convenient
expression for the term in braces and hope that it can be computed recursively.
Call this quantity V ∗
j+1. Starting at age J we have V ∗
J = u(b cJ,b `J) which, for
this age at least, does equal VJ from the δ =1problem. Thus
EJ−1V ∗
J = EJ−1u(b cJ,b `J).
At age J − 1 we are looking for
EJ−2{u(b cJ−1,b `J−1)+βfu(b cJ,b `J)}.
By the law of iterated expectations, the above expression is equal to
EJ−2
n








Thus we can deﬁne
V ∗
J−1 = u(b cJ−1,b `J−1)+βfEJ−1V ∗
J . (15)
The remaining V ∗
j c a nb et h e nc o m p u t e dr e c u r s i v e l yi nas i m i l a rm a n n e r .
Unlike the ‘naive δ < 1’ case, the ‘sophisticated δ < 1’ cannot be solved in
a simple two-pass procedure where we ﬁrst get the V ∗
j and then solve for the
b Vj and the associated policy functions. Instead, after computing the b Vj and
the corresponding policy functions at each age j, we immediately compute V ∗
j ,
because this quantity is needed to solve for b Vj−1. Also note that there is no
‘max’ operator in (15) above as the age-J − 1 agent cannot commit his future
self to a particular course of action but instead he must take the actions of his
future self as given.32
32For values of δ that are suﬃciently close unity, this procedure has been successful in deliv-
ering the value functions and policy functions using the discrete-state methodology. However,
for δ < 0.85, we have encountered numerical problems suggesting indeterminacy or multiplic-
ity of equilibria, similar to those reported by Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (1998) and
Krusell and Smith (1999).
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